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ABSTRACT 
 
This study attempts to examine the relationship between level of diversification and 
board ownership using bivariate correlation analysis. It further analyses using partial 
correlation analysis if any of the selected variables act as a common cause variable that 
correlates level of diversification and firm performance and develop a final estimated 
regression model using the selected variables extracted from 121 listed companies on the 
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchanges (KLSE). Only concentration of ownership and degree of 
shareholders' control shows significant positive correlation.  In the multiple regression 
analysis, dividend policy remains to be the predictor variable for Tobins' Q as a measure 
of firm performance but with a small R square.   
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) state that managers respond to two opposing 
forces and that the relationship between ownership and value depends on which 
force dominates over any particular range of managerial equity ownership.  The 
opposing forces work in the following way.  Manager's natural tendency is to 
allocate the firm's resources in their own best interest, which may conflict with 
the interests of outside shareholders.  As management's equity ownership 
increases, however, their interests are likely to coincide more closely with those 
of outside shareholders.  The first of these forces has a positive effect on the 
value of the firm, which reflects the convergence of interest effect.  The second 
has a negative effect, which reflects the entrenchment effect.  The convergence 
effect suggests that the relationship from the managerial stake and market value 
of the firm is positive as management and shareholder interests converge.  The 
entrenchment effect, however, suggests that the relationship from the managerial 
stake and market value is negative, as a larger managerial stake entrenches and 
insulates management for corporate control.  Morck et al. (1988), point out that it 
is not possible to predict which force will dominate at any level of managerial 
equity ownership.  Thus, the relation between corporate value and ownership 
structure is an empirical issue.  Underlying any study of managerial incentives 
and firm performance is the theory of agency from Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
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This theory suggests that managers acting as agents for owners have a tendency 
to pursue their own goals, which may not always be in agreement with those of 
owners. The potential conflicts of interest from managers (who run corporations) 
and shareholders (who own them) remain to be the main concern in their studies.  
However, this potential conflict can be reduced by two methods; increasing the 
identity from the two groups, typically through inducing managers to own shares 
in the company and board of directors' monitor.  Kesner (1987) argued that the 
greater the directors' share ownership in a company, the better that company's 
performance will be.  Berle and Means (1932) point out the potential conflict of 
interest of corporate managers and dispersed shareholders when managers do not 
have an ownership interest in the firm.  Jensen and Meckling (1976) formalize 
the relation between corporate value and managerial equity ownership.  They 
divide stockholders into two groups – an inside shareholder who manages the 
firm and has exclusive voting rights and outside shareholders who have no voting 
rights.  Both classes of shareholders are entitled to the same dividends per share 
of stock held.  However, the inside shareholder is able to augment this stream of 
cash flow by consuming additional non-marketable perquisites. In this 
framework, there is an incentive for the manager to adopt investment and 
financing policies that benefit him, but reduce the payoff to outside stockholders.  
Thus, the value of the firm depends on the fraction of shares owned by the 
insiders.  The greater the proportion of the shares owned by insiders, the greater 
the value of the firm.  
 
Demsetz (1983), however, argues against this method by raising many offsetting 
corporate events that show insider ownership might hinder the operation of the 
firm, leading to the counter-argument that increased levels of insider ownership 
can result in reduced firm performance.  DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985) suggest 
that managers are motivated to hold common stock for the rights it gives them to 
receive cash benefits from the residual of the firm and voting rights. Cash 
benefits will in turn increase managers' financial incentives while voting rights 
will increase managers' influence on the board of the directors and the firm's 
general policies. 
 
McConnell and Servaes (1990) have reexamined the relationship between the  
firm's value and equity ownership by corporate insiders by using above 1,000 
companies from Value Line Investment Survey and all firms are listed on either 
the NYSE or AMEX for 1976 and 1986.  For both 1976 and 1986, they find a 
curvilinear relation from the fraction of the shares owned by corporate insiders 
and the Tobin's Q ratio of these companies.  The firm's value first increases, then 
decreases as ownership becomes more concentrated in the hand of insiders.  In 
other words, they find that the firm's performance as measured by Tobin's Q, 
rises with ownership at low levels and then declines with ownership at high 
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levels.  Morck et al. (1988) use a sample of 371 Fortune 500 companies for 1980 
to estimate a piecewise linear regression model with Tobin's Q as the independent 
variable and the shareholdings by members of the board of directors as the major 
explanatory variable.  They find that Tobin's Q increases with board ownership 
between 0%–5% and Q then decreases when ownership is more than 5% but up 
to 25%.  For board ownership levels above 25%, Q increases again.  Hermalin 
and Weisbach (1991) estimate piecewise linear regressions on Tobin's Q as the 
dependent variable and the proportion of the equity owned by insiders as the 
independent variable for a sample of 142 NYSE firms for 1971, 1974, 1977, 1980 
and 1983.  They find that the relation between Q and ownership is positive for 
ownership from 0% and 1%, negative for ownership from 1% and 5%, positive 
from 5% and 20% and negative for ownership levels above 20%.  In Malaysia, 
studies on the relationship between board ownership and firm performance have 
been documented by Yeboah-Duah (1993), Mat Nor et al. (1999), and Sanda and 
Ali (2001) with mixed evidences but less attention to  study on the relationship 
between firm's level of diversification and performance and board ownership and 
level of diversification.  Managers may derive private benefit from 
diversification, among others through: reduction in risk of managers' non-
diversified personal portfolios as described by Amihud and Lev (1981), power 
and prestige associated with managing a larger firm as described by Jensen 
(1986) and Stultz (1990), indispensability of manager to the firm as described by 
Shleifer and Vishny (1989) and managerial compensation which is related to firm 
size as described by Jensen and Murphy (1990).  As managers' ownership stakes 
increases, they bear a greater fraction of the cost associated with value-reducing 
actions and therefore less likely to adopt policies that reduce shareholder wealth.  
Thus, if diversification reduces the shareholder wealth, the agency cost 
hypothesis predicts that there will be a negative relationship between the level of 
diversification and managerial equity ownership.  On the relationship between 
board equity ownership and level of diversification, J. Denis, K. Denis and Sarin 
(1997) find that the level of diversification is negatively related to managerial 
equity ownership and to the equity ownership of outside block holders.  
Theoretical arguments suggest that corporate diversification has both benefits and 
costs for shareholders as described by Chandler (1977) and Jensen (1986).  
Berger and Ofek (1995a) describe among others, the potential benefits of 
operating different lines of business within one firm include greater operating 
efficiency, less incentive to forego positive net present value projects, greater 
debt capacity, and lower taxes.  The potential costs of diversification include the 
use of increased discretionary resources to undertake value-decreasing 
investments, cross subsidiaries that allow poor segments to drain resources from 
better performing segments, and misalignment of incentives range of central and 
divisional managers. 
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On the relationship between level of diversification and firm performance, 
empirical studies have generally produced mixed results on diversification's 
overall value effect.  Recent evidence documents that, on average, the cost of 
diversification outweigh the benefits.  Berger and Ofek (1995a), Lang and Stulz 
(1994), and Servaes (1995) show that diversified firms fail to take advantage of 
the purported benefits of diversification.  In addition, Berger and Ofek (1995b), 
Comment and Jarrell (1995) and John and Ofek (1995) document a trend toward 
increased corporate focus in the 1980s and report that this increase in focus is 
associated with significant increases in shareholder value.  In addition, the 
decrease in diversification is associated with external corporate control threats, 
financial distress, and management turnover.  
 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
 
The data were extracted from 121 selected companies in the KLSE Annual 
Companies Handbook, Volume 22, Book 2 (1997).  These firms were selected as 
they provide complete data as required in this study.  We use the percentage of 
director's equity ownership as our proxy for managerial share ownership.  The 
selected variables to examine the linear relationship between each two variables 
using bivariate correlation analysis are as follows:  
 
Y (Tobins'  Q) =  ratio of market value of the firm with the replacement 
cost of the firm's asset.1 
Χ1 (equity) =  board of directors' ownership.  
Χ2 (conc)  = is the ownership concentration measures by the 
Herfindahl Index (H) and defined as H = åj (mj)2; where  
mj is the percentage holding of the jth largest share 
holding group.  
Χ3 (ctrl)  = is the degree of shareholder control with dispersed 
shareholdings measures by the Cubbin-Leech Index (a).2 
Χ4 (div.p)  = reserve/total assets, that controls the effect of the firm's 
dividend policy.  
Χ5 (cap.p)  =  long term liability/total assets, that controls the effect of 
the firm's capital structure. 
Χ6 (HI) =  a revenue-based Herfindahl Index.3 
X7 (f'ond)  =  is a dummy variable, equivalent to 1 if the founder of the 
company is  one of the board members. This variable is 
identical, if more than one member of a family is the 
member of the board of directors.  
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We use similar selected variables to test the common cause hypothesis on the 
relationship between level of diversification and firm performance using partial 
correlation analysis.  In other words, whether level of diversification and firm 
performance are correlated because they shared the same causal variable, in this 
case, board of directors ownership or concentration or controlling share or 
dividend policy or capital structure policy or founder.  
 
We use the stepwise selection method to develop the best linear regression model 
from the above listed variables to predict the dependent or outcome variable 
(Tobin's Q).  The full estimated model is as follows: 
  
Y =   β0 +  β1X1 +  εβ2X2 +  β3 X3 +  β4X4 +  β5X5 + β6 X6 + β7X7 + ε  
 
where,  
 
β0 =  constant 
β1 =  β2 = β3 = β4 = β5 = β6 = β7 = coefficients 
ε  = error term  
 
Based on the documented evidence, this paper attempts to test five null 
hypotheses using Malaysian data as follows: 
 
i. There is no relationship between level of diversification and firm 
performance.  
 
ii. There is no relationship between board of director's ownership and level 
of diversification. 
 
iii. Level of diversification and firm performance are not related with the 
presence of board of directors ownership or concentration or control or 
dividend policy or capital structure policy or founder or each of them is 
not a common cause variable. 
 
iv. Level of diversification and firm performance are not related without the 
presence of board of directors ownership or concentration or control or 
dividend policy or capital structure policy or founder or each of them is a 
strong common cause variable. 
 
v. The data do not fit the final mode or the beta (β) coefficient is equal to 
zero. 
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FINDINGS 
 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the 121 selected KLSE companies. 
The means board of directors' ownership is almost 22% with the maximum at 
almost 84% and mean revenue-based Herfindahl Index with the maximum at 
almost 0.72.  Mean's Tobin's Q is almost 3.4 with maximum almost 33. Using the 
Bonfferoni method to adjust the stated significant level (0.05) by the number of 
correlation (m = 28), the adjusted significant value is given by (0.05/28 ≈ 0.002), 
the statistical results in Table 2 failed to reject the first and second null 
hypotheses since the p-values are greater than 0.002.  Only concentration and 
degree of shareholders control reported positive low correlation (Pearson 
correlation coefficient, r = + 0.489) based on Guilford's Rule of Thumb since the 
p-value (0.0001) is smaller than 0.002.  In other words, we find no relationship 
between level of diversification and firm performance and between board of 
directors' ownership and level of diversification.  We failed to reject the third 
common cause null hypothesis based on Table 3 results since all the p-values are 
larger than significant level 0.05 which conclude that board of directors 
ownership or concentration or control or dividend policy or capital structure 
policy or founder is not a common cause variable that correlate level of 
diversification and firm performance in the case of Malaysia.  The results in 
Table 4 also failed to reject the fourth null hypothesis which conclude that board 
of directors ownership or concentration or control or dividend policy or capital 
structure policy or founder is not a strong common cause variable in the case of 
Malaysia.  To examine whether the data fit the model or beta coefficient is not 
equal to zero, Table 6 shows that the null hypothesis is rejected and the final 
estimated model is as follows: 
 
Y = 4.909 – 5.685 X4 + ε 
 
where, 
 
β0 = constant 
ε  = error term 
 
However, only 3.3% (R2 = 0.033 in Table 5) of the variance of the dependent 
variable (Tobins' Q) is explained by the independent variable (dividend policy) 
which suggest that this model is not really a good descriptor of the relation 
between Tobins' Q and dividend policy. 
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TABLE 1 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF 121 SELECTED KLSE COMPANIES 
 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
EQUITY 143 0.00 83.46 21.1806 25.42156 
NO. SEG 121 1.00 7.00 2.8264 1.67171 
TOBINQ 121 0.02 32.83 3.3894 5.56757 
INDEXH 121 0.21 1.00 0.7171 0.26924 
DIV.P 121 –0.30 0.79 0.2673 0.17739 
CAP.P 121 0.00 2.11 0.1422 0.21761 
CONC 121 0.00 1.00 0.4447 0.21558 
CTRL 121 0.52 1.00 0.6923 0.11163 
FOUNDER 121 0.00 1.00 0.3802 0.48745 
Valid n (listwise) 121     
 
TABLE 2 
CORRELATION 
 
 EQUITY TOBINQ INDEXH CONC CTRL DIV.P CAP.P FOUNDER 
EQUITY Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
1 
– 
143 
–0.019 
0.837 
121 
0.054 
0.558 
121 
–0.101 
0.271 
121 
0.013 
0.885 
121 
0.095 
0.302 
121 
0.70 
0.445 
121 
0.159 
0.081 
121 
TOBINQ Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
–0.019 
0.837 
121 
1 
– 
121 
0.006 
0.951 
121 
–0.012 
0.897 
121 
–0.068 
0.459 
121 
–0.181* 
0.047 
121 
–0.036 
0.696 
121 
–0.082 
0.369 
121 
 
INDEXH Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
0.054 
0.558 
121 
0.006 
0.951 
121 
1 
– 
121 
0.116 
0.206 
121 
0.098 
0.287 
121 
0.147 
0.108 
121 
–0.103 
0.261 
121 
0.122 
0.182 
121 
CONC Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
–0.101 
0.271 
121 
–0.012 
0.897 
121 
0.116 
0.206 
121 
1 
– 
121 
0.489** 
0.000 
121 
–0.008 
0.926 
121 
–0.055 
0.546 
121 
–0.009 
0.924 
121 
CTRL Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
0.013 
0.885 
121 
–0.068 
0.459 
121 
0.098 
0.287 
121 
0.489** 
0.000 
121 
1 
– 
121 
0.199* 
0.029 
121 
–0.022 
0.815 
121 
0.102 
0.267 
121 
DIV.P Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
0.095 
0.302 
121 
–0.181* 
0.047 
121 
0.147 
0.108 
121 
–0.008 
0.926 
121 
0.199* 
0.029 
121 
1 
– 
121 
–0.163 
0.075 
121 
0.122 
0.184 
121 
CAP.P Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
0.070 
0.445 
121 
–0.036 
0.696 
121 
–0.103 
0.261 
121 
–0.055 
0.546 
121 
–0.022 
0.815 
121 
–0.163 
0.075 
121 
1 
– 
121 
0.188* 
0.039 
121 
FOUNDER Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
0.159 
0.081 
121 
–0.082 
0.369 
121 
0.122 
0.182 
121 
–0.009 
0.924 
121 
0.102 
0.267 
121 
0.122 
0.184 
121 
0.188* 
0.039 
121 
1 
– 
121 
 
 * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
TABLE 3 
ZERO ORDER PARTIALS: TOBIN'S Q AND HERFINDAHL INDEX 
 
Variable EQUITY CONC. CTRL CAP.P DIV.P FOND 
p-value 0.951 0.951 0.951 0.951 0.951 0.951 
 
TABLE 4 
CONTROLLING FOR PARTIAL CORRELATION 
 
Variable EQUITY CONC. CTRL CAP.P DIV.P FOND 
p-value 0.951 0.939 0.893 0.983 0.719 0.863 
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TABLE 5 
MODEL SUMMARY 
 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 0.181a 0.033 0.025 5.49842 
 
aPredictors: (Constant), DIV.P 
 
TABLE 6 
ANOVAb 
 
Model  Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 
Residual 
122.062 
3597.680 
1 
119 
122.062 
30.233 
4.037 0.047a 
 Total 3719.742 120    
 
aPredictors: (Constant), DIV.P 
bDependent variable: TOBINQ 
 
TABLE 7 
COEFFICIENTSa 
 
  Unstandardized coefficients 
Standardized 
coefficients   
Collinearity statistic 
Model  B Std. Error Beta t Sig. Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 
DIV.P 
4.909 
–5.685 
0.906 
2.830 
–0.181 5.415 
–2.009 
0.000 
0.047 
1.000 1.000 
 
aDependent variable: TOBINQ 
 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The analysis of the previous sections disclose some interesting results.  The most 
striking is that there appears to be no relation between level of diversification and 
firm performance and board of directors ownership and level of diversification 
which is less consistent with the literature.  The low positive correlation between 
ownership concentration measured in and degree of shareholder means that as 
ownership concentration increases, degree of control increases.  This is not 
consistent with Cubbin and Leech (1983) which argued that as proportion of 
leading or largest shareholding increases, the proportion of shares needed for 
control decreases.  On the common cause hypothesis, should the board of 
directors ownership or concentration or control or dividend policy or capital 
structure policy or founder is a common cause variable, the level of 
diversification and firm performance is expected to be related.  Furthermore, 
should the board of directors ownership or concentration or control or dividend 
policy or capital structure policy or founder is a strong common cause variable 
(after removing/controlling it), level of diversification and firm performance is 
expected not to be related. 
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Other factors except dividend policy is the only predictor variable to explain the 
Tobins' Q in the regression model.  Admittedly, these results could be due to 
inadequately powerful tests and one-time period data used in this study.  Hence, 
more research is needed to further investigate such results in the Malaysian 
context.  
 
 
ENDNOTES 
 
1. However, replacement cost information is not readily accessible.  In this study we use equity 
market to book value of net assets ratio to measure the Tobin's Q. 
 
2.  See Cubbin and Leech (June 1983). 
 
3.  Reflects the degree to which revenue are concentrated in just a few of a company's business 
segments. It is calculated across n business segments as the sum of the squares of each segments i's 
sales, Si  as a proportion of total sales. See Comment and Jarrell (1995). 
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